Arab Tribes, the Umayyad Dynasty, and the `Abbasid Revolution

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Abstract

This essay analyzes the role played by the Arab tribes in the expansion of Islam, the consolidation of Dar al-Islam [House of Islam], as well as in power and administration during the Umayyad dynasty. Given the traditional rivalries between the Mudar and the Qahtan tribes, each confederation of tribes led the expansion of Islam in a different direction: the Mudar toward the east, and the Qahtan toward the west. The Umayyads controlled power by exploiting tribal disputes. The same practice, skillfully used by the `Abbasids, expelled the Umayyads from power and ushered in a new dynasty.

Introduction

O humanity! We have made you male and female, and appointed you to be peoples and tribes in order that you know one another. (Qur’an 49:13)

This passage shows the basic divisions, namely, male and female and especially peoples (ša‘b) and tribes (qaba‘il), that characterized Arab society during the Prophet’s time and, later on, during that of Islam’s expansion and consolidation of Dar al-Islam. Throughout the centuries, many Muslim authors addressed these social divisions. For example, in his descriptions of Arab society, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) explained the importance of Arab...
tribal ḍaḇyāḥ (solidarity) as a way to keep them together and oppose their enemies. Putting aside the fact that he lived many centuries after the period covered in this essay, his opinions are relevant. He showed that ḍaḇyāḥ existed even before Islam and regulated many of the inter-personal relations among tribal members as well as the inter-tribal relations. Al-Maqrizi (d. 1442) wrote that Arab society was divided into six social categories (tabagat): sha'b (peoples), qaba'il (tribes), 'ama'ir (kindred), būtu'n (clans), afkhadh (lineage) and fasa'il (family groups). This important analysis adds more knowledge to the study of Arab tribes and their internal divisions as regards families, clans, kindred, and lineage, even their various rivalries.

In general, the organization of the tribes and their ḍaḇyāḥ were important elements in the Islamic expansion. Since the early stages of the Islamic empire, Arab tribes played a major role in conquering new territories during the caliphate of `Umar (634-44). They were also active in the first fitnah against `Uthman (644-56), as well as in the origins of Shi‘ism and the opposition of Mu‘awiyah against ‘Ali (656-61).

The Umayyads formed the first Muslim dynasty (661-750) and controlled power by exploiting tribal disputes. The ‘Abbasids used the same practice, quite skillfully, to replace the Umayyads. The traditional Arab tribal rivalries played a major role during this time. This essay analyzes the role of the Arab tribes regarding power, administration of the empire during the Umayyad dynasty, as well as their involvement in the Umayyads’ fall and the origins of the ‘Abbasid revolution.

The Arab Tribes: Rivalries and Divisions

In general terms, the tribes fall into two major groups or confederations (ḥilf, ṭaḥdūf): the Northern tribes (e.g., Mudar, Ma‘add, Qays, Qays‘Aylan, and Syrians), comprising a large number of different tribes and the Southern tribes (e.g., Qahtan, Kahan, Kalb, Himyar, and Yemenites), which also had several tribal subdivisions. These two tribal confederations were in a state of almost constant rivalry dating back to the Arab’s early history. Their rivalries were mainly economic and political. When they had to share the same territories, space, water, and caravan routes, problems arose. The Northerners were mainly nomads, while the Southerners were devoted mainly to agriculture. The location of Southern tribes in northern territories even before the origins of Islam – for example, the Lakhmids in al-Hira on the Euphrates and the settlements of Northern tribes in the south – were motives for dispute, such as when members of the other confederation
invaded what they considered to be their own territory, or when nomads moved in.

The tribal conflicts were between confederations and also between a given confederation’s tribes, as portrayed in Arab legends, literature, and history. In many cases, the rivalries between two tribes of the Northern group were so profound that one of the two would unite and ask for help from their enemies, the Qahtan, to defeat the other Northern group. Such was the case of the Rabih, a member of the Mudar tribal confederation, who allied with the Azd, of the Qahtan group, in order to defend their own interests and to oppose the Tamim, another Northern tribe. Islam did not overcome these social and ethnic tribal rivalries, which were due mainly to economics and politics. However, social, ethnic, and racial motives have also been mentioned and taken into consideration. The process of making alliances between different groups of tribes, even between their traditional enemies, has been explained by many Muslim historians as well as by several western scholars, who described how the wars between the Tamim and the Azd in Central Asia and Khurasan generated a major problem between the Mudar and the Yemenites.

Ignaz Goldziher explained that Islam teaches a different relation of the individual and the Arab tribes with society, from that of the Jahiliyah period. In pre-Islamic Arab society, the tribal feuds also had focused on mocking the enemy through poetry. Poets frequently had a tremendous impact on a particular tribe’s position within Arabic society:

One single line of Jarir (d. 110), that classic of the later hija’, against the tribe of Numayr (“Lower your eyes because you are of the tribe of Numayr,” etc.) damaged the reputation of this tribe to such an extent that a Numayrite, when asked his tribe, did not dare to name it, but professed to belong to the tribe of Banu `Amir from which the Banu Numayr derived.

Poets also spread the ideals of Muruwwāh (virtue) and ḥasāb (enumeration of the ancestors’ famous deeds; nobility), which were important for both the individual’s and the tribe’s esteem and for satirizing (hijā’) the tribal enemy, then considered inferior. Although Islam preaches equality and fraternity among all individuals, and that all Muslims were brothers and sisters in the ummah (community), the tribal rivalries continued and much hatred and fighting took place throughout the history of the Islamic empire.

The process of making and breaking alliances took place in both the west and the east of the empire, and was a major reason for the success of the `Abbasid revolution. In al-Andalus, for example, Arab tribes often allied
themselves with traditional enemies to fight another tribe from the same confederation or *sha'b* to improve and defend their own position. Economic interest was one reason for these strange, but not unusual, alliances.9

The Arab tribes accepted Islam, as Ibn Hisham writes in his *Ši’rat Rāṣul Allāh*.10 Both the Northern and the Southern tribes participated eagerly in the Islamic expansion, which had, along with religious motives, economic and political reasons. Fred Donner emphasizes the religious motives for the expansion.11 Perhaps the main cause for their eager participation was the share of booty,12 despite Shaban’s opinion that the Mudar favored a major expansion while the Qahtan proposed a consolidation of the empire instead.

The disputes between the Qahtan and the Qays tribes increased during the conquests for economic and political reasons. In the analysis and in the general explanations of the tribes’ expansion along with that of Islam (*intishar al-Islam*), one has to be aware of various elements of this process. The following three are the most important:

First, the initial wave of expansion, directed toward Arabia’s north and east, was carried out mainly by the Northern tribes, especially Arabs from Makkah and the surrounding areas. These armies conquered Syria and Palestine, after the battle of Yarmuk (636). Jerusalem surrendered (637) to caliph ’Umar, and Jazirah (Iraq) fell after the battle of Qadisiyah (637).13 It seems possible that most heroes of the *riddah* war were from the Mudar confederation.14 Thus, in this expansion, the Mudar (or Qays) obtained a large share of the booty as well as the best lands, for the Qahtan were not favored at that time. According to al-Baladhuri, the Qahtan, the Southern tribes, or Ahl al-Yaman, demanded equal treatment in privileges and land ownership, although their role in the expansion was inferior to the Mudar’s.15

These conquests opened the doors for further expansion toward the east. They were led by the Northern tribes, who benefited the most from the resulting booty and wealth. The Southern tribes also participated, but in lesser numbers, and so they received a far smaller share of the spoils and revenues than their traditional enemies. The Northern tribes also occupied the land. Moreover, very soon after they settled down they engaged in trade, which brought them considerable benefits.

Second, when the Southern tribes saw their opportunities for benefit, land, trade, and especially booty, closed in the east and blocked by their tribal enemies, they initiated another wave of expansion westward, mainly toward North Africa and al-Andalus, two regions that they conquered with great benefit. A close reading of ’Abd al-Rahman ibn ’Abd al-Hakam’s (d. 871) *Futuh Miṣr wa Akhbaruḥa* reveals that the Southern tribes held the
main positions in the army and the governorship of provinces and cities. Al-Maqqari (d. 1632) asserted in his Kitab Nafiḥ al-Tib that as the Qahtan settled in al-Andalus in great numbers they brought with them their hereditary hatred of the Mudar and other tribes from the line of `Adnan.16 He also asserted that the Qahtan tribes were more numerous in al-Andalus than their adversaries, and always obtained a greater share of power and influence." This is probably one reason why the `Abbasid revolution was not as well received in al-Andalus as it was in the East.

Moreover, al-Andalus was far from the caliphal centers of power. Although not totally apart from the caliph’s main policies, al-Andalus faced other problems, such as the struggles against the Christians and the Franks, as well as the Berber revolts in both al-Andalus and North Africa, which distracted the Qahtan from the `Abbasid propaganda (centered mainly in Khurasan). The opposite occurred in the East, as can be seen by looking at the tribal origin of those in important administrative and military positions, who were mainly from the Northern tribes. Although al-Hajjaj intended to maintain a balance of power between the two confederations while he governed Iraq and Khurasan by appointing Southerners in subgovernor positions, in the long run the Umayyads favored the Mudar over the Qahtan.

This information is provided in the major Arabic sources, such as al-Tabari, al-Baladhuri, Ibn Majah, among others, and later Arabic works, such as al-Suyuti’s Ta’rikh al-Khulafa’.18

However, one should not think that the Northern or the Southern tribes settled exclusively in the east or the west, respectively, of Dar al-Islam. Both tribal groups expanded and settled throughout the empire, a situation that aggravated their traditional rivalries. In addition, they brought their traditional feuds to those distant regions.

Third, the expansion should not be understood only as originating from a religious motivation. This process was neither an expansion of Islam nor a single movement that stopped as soon as the tribes settled. The process was quite the contrary, for Islam’s expansion also led the Arab tribes to undertake one of the largest expansions in history: from Arabia to Iraq, Khurasan, and the Chinese Empire, and to North Africa and Spain (al-Andalus).

Arabic became the official and religious language of the vast empire, although some languages were kept for religious purposes (e.g., Coptic, Greek, Latin, Persian) and others continued to be spoken (e.g., Berber, Romance [Spanish], Aramaic, Turkish, and Persian). The conquered peoples adopted Arabic culture.19 The Arabization process took several centuries and finally prevailed in the east (with the exception of Iran) and in
North Africa. The case of al-Andalus is totally different, since Islam and the Arabic culture, language, and customs were replaced by those of the Christian Spaniards after the Reconquista.

The empire-wide expansion of the Arab tribes, which took many years, proves several things. First of all, it shows their interest in acquiring booty, wealth, and land in places outside Arabia. They were also seeking better conditions. Al-Baladhuri’s statement that there were more Arabs in Iraq than in Syria proves the extent of the migrations to the north and east. For many Arabs of this time, this was an excellent opportunity to search for better economic conditions abroad. In addition, the share of booty was always an important incentive. An interesting speculation, although little evidence exists for it since Arabic sources do not deal with it, is that Arabia was overpopulated in relation to the availability of food and water resources.

Another proof that these migrations were not undertaken in a single wave is that the Arabic sources speak of problems between “old” and “new” Arabs settled in different regions, whether they were in al-Andalus, Iraq, Khurasan, or Ma wara’ al-Nahr (roughly modern-day Uzbekistan and southwest Kazakhstan). These migrations brought new struggles wherever the migrants settled, especially if the new Arab settlers belonged to the opposite tribal confederation’s members already settled in those regions.

The system of land ownership and the establishment of jund (sing: jund, armed groups) also caused increased tribal rivalries. The rapid expansion from Arabia to Syria, Mesopotamia, Iran, Egypt, North Africa, and al-Andalus made Muslims adopt the existing Byzantine and Persian institutions. Lacking administrative experience and the institutions to control and keep the conquered areas together, the Arabs transformed the basic division of spoils and territories from the three categories explained by al-Baladhuri in Muhajirun, Ansar, and the wives of the Prophet, to a major and better organized one following the ancient Roman practice of the limitanei: soldiers who received land in return for defending the empire’s frontiers. The Muslims adopted this practice by settling the jund and building fortresses (āṣr, sing: misr) in the Dar al-Islam’s frontier areas (hudud).

Al-Baladhuri analyzed the organization of the jund in Syria and Egypt, as well as the divisions of the spoils of war and territories among Muslim soldiers. For the case of Egypt, Ibn `Abd al-Hakam explained the creation of a diwan for dividing the conquered territories. After Jerusalem capitulated, the Ahd al-`Umariyah stipulated how the territories would be divided. The presence of these armed tribal groups led to more inter-tribal rivalries, especially in Khurasan and Iraq. The traditional Qays-Qahtan dis-
pute also had an economic context in Khurasan, as well as in other regions, that was expressed in the territorial divisions and the role played by the *junud* with very clear economic interests and socioeconomic status.

Religious and political issues were also important. Both tribal confederations claimed superiority, but on different grounds. The Qahtan, due to the prestige of their southern kingdoms and culture before Islam, felt that they were superior to their enemies (the Qays). However, the origins of Islam and the preponderance of the Quraysh tribe (a tribe of the Ma`add group) gave the Northern tribes a more prestigious position among Arabs and all Muslims. The Northern tribes frequently asserted that the Jahiliyah (the pre-Islamic period of ignorance) is associated with the Yemenites, while Islam is associated with the Mudar. 30 They also said very proudly that the Prophet arose from their group to transmit the revelation and that the expected caliph will rise from among them. 31

In his *Al-Farq bayna al-Firaq*, al-Baghdadi (d. 1037) described the pride of the Quraysh tribe for receiving the revelation. Furthermore, they asserted that “The imamate must not be, save among the Quraysh” and frequently repeated the *hādīth* (pl. *ahadīth*) of Prophet Muhammad: “The Êmams are of the Quraysh” 32 as well as the tradition attributed to Abu Bakr that the Quraysh were the most noble of all Arabs. 33 They also remembered what Abu Bakr said concerning the leadership of the Quraysh and the submission of others, even the Ansar: “Nahnu al-Umara’ wa Antum al-Ansar” (“We are the Amirs and you are the helpers [supporters].”).

All of these ideas made the Northern tribes feel proud and superior to the Southern tribes. The fact that the Qur’ân was transmitted in Arabic to a Qurayshi was also emphasized over the centuries, especially the importance of Arabic in maintaining Muslim unity and the ummah’s integrity. Several Muslim scholars wrote on Arabic’s importance and the Quraysh’s prestige. For example, Ibn Qutaybah (d. 889?) wrote in his *Ta’wil al-Qur’an* about Arabic’s importance for the revelation and the unity that it gave Muslims. 34 Al-Suyuti (d. 1505), in his *Al-Itqan fi `Ulum al-Qur’ân*, emphasized its importance and the Qur’ân’s revelation to a Qurayshi, and referred to the importance of using one language for the sake of unity. 35

The Yemenites responded in several ways. The Southern tribes described the greatness of their past, made Qahtan a son of Prophet Hud, and gave him some other special genealogical origins. They also claimed that Qahtan was a direct descendant of Isma’il, the “father of all Arabs,” as Ibn Hisham, al-Tabari, and other Muslim historians explained. 36 Ibn Hisham not only mentioned what the Yemenites believed and thought about
their own origins, but also their opinions about being direct descendants of Isma’il. He wrote:

All Arabs are descended from Isma’il and Qahtan. Some of the people of Yaman claim that Qahtan was a son of Isma’il and so, according to them, Isma’il is the father of all Arabs.37

The tribes played an important political role during the Umayyad period. Despite the fact that Islam preached equality (musawa’h) of all people, in which tribal origin supposedly would have no effect, the tribes were always important. Belonging to a particular tribe could have meant either a prestigious position or a severe social limitation.

The caliphs’ policies had a direct impact upon tribal power and land ownership, for both the Mudar and the Qahtan could improve their position via royal support. However, the local administration of certain parts of Khurasan was left to the dāḥaqīn (the Persian aristocracy). According to the terms of surrender between ‘Umar and the conquered Persians, the local dāḥaqīn levied the tributes without direct Arab interference and paid them to the ruling Arabs, after keeping a considerable part for themselves. Despite this local administration, the whole region was undoubtedly controlled by the Arabs, especially the Northern tribes, who were usually well-connected with the ruling class in Damascus (a good example of this was the government of Ibn Zur’ah, who had the support of the Qaysites) and managed to secure more privileges and a better position than the Qahtan tribes. Sometimes, various tribes were granted special privileges and leading positions, a situation that was detrimental to other groups.

Many things were expected in return for these privileges and patronage, such as establishing a better control of the empire’s frontiers and collecting taxes. The major privileges granted were land, administrative positions in cities and provinces, command in various military expeditions, booty allotments, patronage, tax exemption, and favoritism in trade, industry, and mining. The rulers even allowed certain governors permission to mint coins and granted political-religious administrative positions, such as Qadi al-Islam (judge of Islam), qadi of a city, Shaykh al-Balad (chief of a village), Sahib al-Madinah (inspector of the city), Sahib al-Saqiyah (inspector of irrigation and water distribution), and Sahib al-Suq (inspector of the market, later also called muḥtāṣib). These positions gave the holders power and prestige.

Some people improved their socioeconomic situation via favoritism and the grant of privileges. Although the Arabic sources speak about two social classes, the khassah (elite) and the ‘ammah (general public), favoritism and...
privileges helped develop a middle class, so-called for lack of a better term. This proves that there was a degree of social mobility. It was also possible to join the middle class through education (become a member of the ulama) and through success in trade, industry, and agriculture.

Throughout Islamic history, the opposite process also occurred. In many instances, middle-class people lost their patrons or their property, or saw their businesses collapse. Such events jeopardized their social status, and, by impoverishing them, forced them to become part of the `ammah (ra`ya in the Ottoman period). Those tribes not favored by the system fought against it, hoping to gain the same privileges from a new government. The betterment of those favored tribes stirred the envy, opposition, and anger of the unfavored tribes. This led them to fight against their traditional enemies and against the Umayyad caliph, their enemies’ major supporter. These tribal disputes, although ancient and traditional, assumed very clear political and socioeconomic causes during the Umayyad period.

The possession and use of land brought many benefits to those in charge. However, rather than cultivating their land with their own hands, they used peasants or hired others through various agricultural contracts (muzara`ah, mugharasah, musaqah) to do their work, and then enjoyed the resulting revenues. However, they were supposed to respect and follow the tradition of ihya` al-ard al-mayyitah (revivifying the dead land, namely, land reclamation). In an agricultural society, who received the revenues that the land produced as well as who owned the parcels (qati`ah, pl. qata`i’) of land was extremely important.38

In dealing with such issues of land ownership, agriculture, parcels, and so on, one has to remember that at the beginning of the expansion, these tribes were not supposed to settle down, but were to live in the garrison cities (misr, pl. amsar). But they did settle down and acquire land, and the caliphs granted them privileges. After this, they lived among the mawali and the Persians in Khurasan and Iraq. They even adopted some Persian religious celebrations, spoke Persian in their daily market transactions, and dressed like Persians in that part of the empire.39 Shortly afterward, they were engaged in trade between Khurasan and Ma wara` al-Nahr.

Those granted important political administrative positions benefited a great deal. In most cases they were in charge of tax collection, and usually profited personally from the revenues. The case of Yazid ibn al-Muhallab in Iraq and Khurasan, whether or not he illegally acquired personal benefits from this activity, is a clear example. Caliph `Umar II jailed him allegedly for stealing from the public treasury. This is only one of many examples.40
Those appointed to important provinces had tremendous administrative power and often chose members of their own tribes to rule smaller provinces and cities, as well as to raise and command armies in the wars of expansion. For example, Khalid ibn `Abd Allah al-Qasri, governor of Iraq (724-38) during Hisham’s (724-43) reign, appointed his brother Asad al-Qasri on two occasions (724-26 and 734-38) as governor of Khurasan. Some tribes who occupied administrative positions became extremely powerful. The best example is the Thaqafi tribe, with al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf under `Abd al-Malik (685-705) and al-Walid I (705-15). Another case was the already mentioned Yazid ibn al-Muhallab of the Azd Southern tribe.

In their administrative positions, the governors and army commanders gained considerably both in their persons and in their tribes. Some became so powerful and rich that they revolted against the caliph. These rebellions were numerous, such as the one led by `Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Ash`ath. Other governors became so powerful that the caliph removed them before they could challenge him and establish independent states. Examples of this are Musa ibn Nusayr’s removal in Ifriqiyyah and al-Andalus, and also his client Tariq ibn Ziyad during al-Walid I’s reign.41 `Umar II’s removal of Yazid ibn al-Muhallab can be interpreted in the same way. Other governors were removed because of inter-tribal fighting and rivalry, such as Yazid ibn al-Muhallab, who was replaced by Qutaybah ibn Muslim. If the governors of provinces and rulers of cities belonged to the same Umayyad ruling family, they also profited from the properties (real estate) and luxurious houses built with public money and given to members of the Marwanid family.

Those chosen by the caliph or his representatives (na`ib, pl. nuwwab) in the provinces as governors (`amil, pl. `ummal) to lead military expeditions for new conquests also benefited greatly. In most cases, both the leaders and their tribes profited from the booty. In the expansionist wars there was, right from the outset, the promise of sharing the booty among the participants. This promise was an important incentive for Arab tribes to enroll in those campaigns. In this respect, one has to bear in mind two important issues.

First, both the Northern and Southern tribes conducted and benefited from Islam’s expansion and conquests. Since the time of `Umar, the Qays tribes always favored new expansionist wars in order to benefit economically. The Qahtan tribes also favored Islam’s expansion and directed it toward the west. The Southern tribes mainly shared with the Shu`ubiyyah the projects for assimilation (i.e., acceptance and equal treatment for non-Arab converts [mawali]). It is relevant, as well, to remember that the Yemenite tribes also organized and participated in expansionist wars.
(again, the case of Yazid ibn al-Muhallab is a good example in this respect).
In fact, on numerous occasions the inter-tribal rivalries in Iraq and Khurasan were sparked by the expansionist wars and the share of booty, and also because of the way the Mudar, in defense of their own group, blocked the Yemenites from participating in such campaigns.

Second, despite the great number of Arabs who moved to Iraq, Khurasan, North Africa, and al-Andalus, they were always a minority (although the ruling group) population among the local Persians, Berbers, or Visigoths. For their expansionist wars, the Arabs had to enroll and organize armies of local people. The armies organized by Tariq ibn Ziyad and Musa ibn Nusayr to capture al-Andalus were mainly Berber.42 In the east, Qutaybah ibn Muslim drafted local Persians who had participated in the conquest of Central Asia as far away as Farghana. His army, like many similar armies organized for the expansionist wars by Arab military leaders in the east, was composed mainly of *mawali*. However, the *mawali* were not treated as equals of Arab Muslims, for they received a smaller share of the booty. Arabic sources are explicit about this and show how much discrimination took place in the allotment of the booty.

This unjust treatment of Persians and Berbers conscripts was an important reason for the *mawali* revolts both in the east and the west, in North Africa and al-Andalus.43 In al-Andalus, for example, land distribution was a contentious issue. Arabs controlled the best lands, and Berbers were confined to the most arid regions of Galicia, León, Asturias, La Mancha, and Extremadura. Abu al-`Abbas Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn `Idhari even affirmed that Berbers disliked living in cities and preferred those arid lands because they resembled their native territories in North Africa.44 These opinions of a major chronicler should, obviously, be taken carefully.

Umayyad Politics and Government: Administration, Tribal Divisions, and the Origins of the `Abbasid Revolution

The numerous privileges granted by the Umayyads to the Northern tribes with respect to land ownership, commanding and leading positions, tax exemption, and others upset the Qahtan. The Southerners opposed both the Mudar and the Umayyads and fought strongly against their enemies in Iraq and Khurasan. This led to the Umayyads’ collapse and the `Abbasids’ rise to power. It is important to keep in mind that the `Abbasids gained power not only because of the Southern tribes’ support, but for many other reasons as well, such as the involvement of the *mawali* and other groups. The analy-
sis of their disputes in other parts of the empire, although mentioned for North Africa and al-Andalus, is beyond the scope of this essay when dealing with the `Abbasid revolution, since it had little impact on the West.

The first three Umayyad caliphs, Mu`awiyah (661-80),45 Yazid (680-83),46 and Mu`awiyah II (683-84),47 who formed the Sufyaniyah Umayyad family, supported the Southern tribes. According to al-Tabari, Mu`awiyah encouraged and even ordered the settlement of 50,000 Azd families in Khurasan.48 They settled mainly in Merv (Marw) and its environs. He helped them because they had supported Talhah and al-Zubayr against `Ali and thus were reputed to be anti-`Alid.49 The Northern tribes opposed these measures. However, no fighting took place in Jazirah (Iraq) or Syria, probably due to the fear of the caliph and his tight administration. The Mudar-Qahtan rivalry was reactivated in those areas after Mu`awiyah’s death, especially under Yazid, who was challenged by the fitnah (civil war) of `Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr. Yazid faced the opposition of some Northern tribes that supported Ibn al-Zubayr. Yazid faced the opposition of some Northern tribes that supported Ibn al-Zubayr in the Hijaz, because of his pro-Qahtan policy.50

Marwan I (684-85), who succeeded Mu`awiyah ibn Yazid,51 started the Marwanid Umayyad dynasty, the second and last Umayyad ruling family. His mother was a Kalbi, and thus he relied on the Qahtan tribes. The Qays did not like the predominant position of their enemies, the Kalbis, and opposed the rulers. Some Qays tribes, especially the Sulaym, the ‘Amir, and the Ghatafan, supported ‘Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr’s claims in the Hijaz.52 Al-Baladhi wrote that Ibn Ziyad, governor of the Khurasan province that included Sistan, was neither respected nor accepted by the tribes. Due to these reasons, he fled that region and joined Ibn al-Zubayr.53 However, a large percentage of Southern Arabs had moved to and settled in Khurasan, following Mu`awiyah’s order, only to find that the Northern tribes had already occupied the best land.

These facts explain, in part, the inter-tribal rivalries in both places, especially for economic and political reasons. For example, in Iraq Arabs moved in and settled mainly in the fertile lands of Kufah and Basrah. Those who arrived first viewed the late-comers as a challenge to their position. Thus, problems arose because those who were not favored by the land distribution resented the privileged status enjoyed by the region’s “old” Arabs. The Yemenites fought the Mudar in Iraq because the Northern tribes monopolized the best lands and blocked the Southern tribes from participating in the profitable expansionist wars in Armenia.54 On the other hand, the Mudar opposed and fought the Qahtan who had settled in Khurasan, a region where there were more Northern than Southern tribes. Aside from
this, the former claimed more rights for having participated directly in the conquest.55

Contrary to the Sufyanids’ more indirect way of governing, the Marwanids always tried to balance the asharf (the tribal leaders) and the governors through a centralized system of government. The Marwanids also established an army that was responsible to the Amir al-Mu’minin and the governors and served as the main instrument for the empire’s centralization, defense, and administration. For the first time, it was loyal to the caliph.56 Syrian troops, who formed the imperial army, were sent to different parts of the empire to put down revolts, centralize the administration, and keep direct control of the empire. However, their presence in Iraq and Khurasan caused further problems, as a result of the antagonism between Syria and Iraq. Syrian troops were also sent to North Africa and al-Andalus to stop Berber revolts. For example, Hisham sent Syrian troops (led by Balj ibn Bishr) to subdue the Berber revolt in North Africa and al-Andalus. In the Iberian Peninsula, inter-tribal feuds also occurred during the presence of Syrian troops, since the governorship of al-Andalus was Yemenite.

During the Marwanid period, the caliphs started relying on military men as governors. Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf is a clear example of a person of humble origins rising to important positions through military services, which he began in the shurah (police) of Damascus. He eventually became the architect of ’Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan’s military, political, and economic reforms.57 As part of the centralization program, the Marwanids started new institutions with a clear purpose. The barid (postal system) was very well organized both as an efficient communication system and as an excellent way to keep the government informed about possible problems or revolts in the provinces. The writing and sealing of documents were developed through the institutions of diwan al-rasa’il and diwan al-khatam.

The Marwanids also introduced a specific Muslim coinage in their lands, replacing the old Sasanid and Byzantine coins. Real Muslim coins were minted under ’Abd al-Malik and his governor al-Hajjaj. They were purely epigraphic and without the ruler’s portrait, for Islam forbids the depiction of any human or animal figures.58 Having their own coins, along with the Syrian army and the centralization plans, gave the Marwanid Umayyad dynasty, great power, and efficient control of the empire.

’Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan (685-705), who succeeded the brief reign of Marwan I59 and married a Qaysi woman of the ’Abs, supported and relied on the Qays tribal confederation, especially through the support he gave the Thaqafi tribe by appointing al-Hajjaj governor of Iraq. By this time, al-
Hajjaj had already defeated Ibn al-Zubayr in the Hijaz. Al-Hajjaj consolidated the Qays’ power in Iraq and Khurasan.

His mission was not easy, and numerous struggles were launched against him. It is possible to infer that the caliph was aware of the difficulties and problems associated with controlling the tribes, and, in an attempt to convince al-Hajjaj to move to that area, even offered him the city-fortress of Kufah as a gift (sadaqah). In a letter quoted by al-Baladhuri in his Ansab al-Ashr, the caliph wrote: Ya Hajjaj qad ataytuka al-Kufah sadaqatan fa-ta’ha wata’t yatada’al minha ahl al-Basrah. (Oh Hajjaj, I have given you al-Kufah as a gift, therefore, control it so firmly that the people of al-Basrah will be intimidated [they will be fearful and they won’t revolt against you].”) 

`Abd al-Malik appointed him in order to gain effective control of Iraq and to stop all rebellions. In order to accomplish these tasks, al-Hajjaj obliged Arabs to join the army to defeat the Khawarij and to participate in new wars of expansion. Those who refused faced decapitation, an effective threat, although some Arabs complained about his tyrannical methods. In such a decree, one can easily see why so many Arabs accuse the Umayyads of brutality and despotism.

Al-Hajjaj was able to control the tribes in Iraq because of their weak position. Their internal problems and the Khawarij threat had weakened them to the point that, despite occasional and poor resistance, they accepted him, especially in the major garrison cities of Kufah and Basrah. He faced a more serious Khawarij opposition in Iraq in both the rural and the urban areas. For example, the Azariqah of Basrah strongly opposed the Umayyad’s control of the city. In Kufah, Shahib ibn Yazid led the Khawarij resistance to al-Hajjaj. To quell the Khawarij revolts, Syrian forces were sent to Iraq. Also during this time, the garrison city of al-Wasit was founded, according to the sources, mainly to serve as a base for the Syrian troops.

Although al-Hajjaj tried to balance the Arab tribal disputes and power struggles, and although he appointed al-Muhallab ibn Sufrah and Yazid ibn al-Muhallab of the Azd tribe as governors of Khurasan and kept them there for several years, in the long run he favored the Qays’ power. Later on, he replaced Yazid ibn al-Muhallab with Qutaybah ibn Muslim, a Qaysite from the weak Bahilah clan. The Southern tribes opposed these political measures, and new tensions arose between the two tribal confederations.

Qutaybah ibn Muslim governed Khurasan for 10 years (705-15) and favored the expansionist wars, as proved by his numerous successful conquests in Central Asia. He conquered those important cities that contributed so much to Islam’s greatness: Samarqand, Bukhara, Paykand, and
Khwarizm. His armies went as far as Farghana. However, al-Walid I’s (705-15) succession to power had a direct impact upon Khurasan and the administration of Central Asia. Al-Walid I was very careful not to irritate the Kalbis in those campaigns organized by Qutaybah ibn Muslim and was concerned that neither the Syrian nor the Iraqi armies were strong enough to participate in long and dangerous Central Asian campaigns. This is a major reason why Qutaybah ibn Muslim drafted local people into his army.

Since Sulayman (715-17) supported the Yemenites and tried to balance the Qays’ power, Al-Walid I’s sudden death and the rise of the rival party made Qutaybah ibn Muslim fear for his position. Hoping that his army would support him, he revolted against Sulayman in 715. However, his army deserted and killed him that same year.

This revolt exemplifies the eastern regions’ political instability, as well as their inter-tribal struggle for power, prestige, and influence. Furthermore, one has to keep in mind that while al-Hajjaj’s policies encouraged land ownership and other privileges for the Northern tribes, the Yemenites demanded equal treatment. ‘Izz al-Din ibn al-Athir, in his Al-Kamil fi al-Ta’rikh, also described these inter-tribal problems and the Azd tribe’s opposition to the final aman of al-Hajjaj. Tribal rivalries broke out again for the same old economic and political reasons even before al-Hajjaj dismissed Yazid ibn al-Muhallab, the Azd governor of Khurasan, and replaced him with Qutaybah ibn Muslim. At this point, a new alliance between the Azd and the Rabi’ah was established to defend their interests and to oppose the Tamim.

These inter-tribal problems were exacerbated by the Marwanids’ appropriating and then dividing land among their family members and tribal allies. This policy, clearly developed in the practice of the sawali (gain land capable of cultivation from deserts, marshes, and the sea), which was pursued by ‘Abd al-Malik and al-Walid I, really angered the Southern tribes, for the Marwanids used public funds to gain those lands, which they then allotted only to members of the Marwanid family. Discontent spread among many people, especially the Yemenites in Khurasan, who noted that the Marwanids excluded them, with only a few exceptions, from public positions and from many land distribution and land ownership projects.

More social, ethnic, and economic problems arose when al-Hajjaj supported the Arabs over the mawali. This situation also aggravated the new converts’ grievances. The mawali were ready to revolt or to join and support any rebellion against the Umayyads in order to stop the heavy taxation, the official policies of discrimination, and the tyrannical ways of ruling. For very similar reasons, the dahaqin of Iraq and the eastern provinces of Iran...
were also in a difficult economic situation and were discouraged by the Umayyad administration. Even the *dahiqin* were eager to support a rebellion against al-Hajjaj. With all of these economic, political, and social grievances, along with reduced stipends (*`ata‘*), to the army and the presence of Syrian troops in the eastern provinces, `Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Ash`ath’s rebellion broke out even before the Azdite Yazid ibn al-Muhallab was replaced by the Qaysite Qutaybah ibn Muslim.

There is evidence in Arabic sources that after Ibn al-Ash`ath was defeated in Iraq and fled with some of his followers to Khurasan, the province’s Azdite governor (Ibn al-Muhallab) sent back to al-Hajjaj, then in al-Wasit, only the Mudar supporters of the revolt and treated the Yemenites with respect and consideration. Thus, this revolt should be analyzed according to this understanding and general perspective. As regards the grievances already mentioned, it is possible to note the reasons for the popular, although limited, support this revolt gained from the different social and ethnic groups, the major supporters being the Southern tribes and the *mawali*.

This revolt also had religious overtones. Both groups appealed to God, the true religion, and other religious aspects. The rebels even called al-Hajjaj “the enemy of God.” No wonder that the revolt was supported by most religious people, the ulama (learned people, religious leaders), and the *qurra‘* (the Qur’an readers), with the exception of the celebrated al-Hasan al-Basri, as explained by Hans Heinrich Schaeder and Hellmut Ritter. However, al-Nadim, in his *Kitab al-Fihrist*, affirmed that al-Hasan al-Basri had some loyalty to `Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Ash`ath. Thus, shortly after Ibn al-Ash`ath’s defeat by the Syrian troops, al-Hasan al-Basri went to al-Hajjaj who, according to al-Nadim, rebuked him and then granted al-Hasan al-Basri the pardon. Al-Hasan al-Basri never felt safe around al-Hajjaj, and, according to al-Nadim, rejoiced when al-Hajjaj died in 714.

Ibn al-Ash`ath’s revolt lost some popular support with al-Hajjaj’s promises of pardon for those who renounced the revolt and submitted to the central administration: the Umayyad state. In addition, the Syrian army was more powerful than that of Ibn al-Ash`ath. There is no doubt that the presence of Syrian troops imposed respect on the rebels, and that their mere presence convinced many rebels to submit. Al-Hajjaj was able to enter Kufah and forgive those who had laid their arms aside. Moreover, the religious propaganda also played a major role in encouraging many to revolt against the so-called infidel Umayyads and for many to submit to al-Hajjaj, who skillfully spread the idea that the rebels had renounced Islam. On the other hand, al-Hasan al-Basri also had a great influence on many people.
The role played by the *mawali* was also of great relevance, since according to general Umayyad policy, new converts were not fairly treated because they were not Arabs. The *mawali* supported this revolt, for they viewed it as a way to fight against the unjust Umayyad rule, the official discrimination that considered them inferior, and the heavy taxation. For the same reasons, the Persian *dahaqin* also supported the rebellion. After the revolt was suppressed, they faced serious consequences: Al-Hajjaj removed them from their previous position of tax collectors. Other rebellions throughout the Muslim history had very similar causes. Their appeals for change and equality in Muslim society were important aspirations that resurfaced frequently. The `Abbasid revolution was no exception in this respect.

In the long run, the Umayyad dynasty favored the Northerners over the Southerners. Yazid ibn al-Muhallab’s revolt in 720 against Yazid II exemplifies both these inter-tribal rivalries and the opposition to the Umayyads.80 Thus, this revolt should be analyzed from the perspective of inter-tribal disputes and enmity toward Umayyad rule. The popular support that Ibn al-Muhallab gained in Basrah and other places in Iraq, from both the Northern and Southern tribes, is proof of anti-Umayyad feeling. However, he obtained more support from the Southern tribes, despite the fact that his own tribe (the Azd) did not entirely support him. The ideology, the appeals to religion and freedom from Umayyad control, and the Syrian troops (he proclaimed a jihad against the Syrians) could make one think about his proto- or semi-independent aspirations for Iraq and possibly for Khurasan. Again, the celebrated al-Hasan al-Basri opposed this movement, as he had done earlier with Ibn al-Ash’ath’s revolt.81 Although he did not favor the Umayyads openly, neither did he accept Yazid ibn al-Muhallab’s aspirations and claims to the caliphate.82

Ibn al-Muhallab’s revolt was extremely important, enjoyed popular support, and may be considered a precursor of the `Abbasid revolution. In addition to Arab tribal help, he also gained *mawali* support. Although there is no evidence in the sources that the *dahaqin* helped him, it is reasonable to infer that they did, for they had supported Ibn al-Ash’ath’s revolt. Also, it is reasonable to speculate that they backed this revolt in the hope of recapturing their previous position as tax collectors, which they had lost for supporting Ibn al-Ash’ath. They could also have helped Ibn al-Muhallab, because they were interested in more expansionist wars to keep the Arabs away and avoid the assimilation programs forwarded in the famous Fiscal Rescript of the recently disappeared caliph `Umar II (717-20).
For the *dahaqin*, Yazid ibn al-Muhallab was portrayed as a leader who favored Islam’s expansion due to his involvement in campaigns in Transoxiana while serving as governor of Khurasan under Sulayman. His revolt had a catastrophic end when he faced the Umayyad army. However, his impact was considerable, because the `Abbasids took several of the traditions developed after this revolt. First, Ibn al-Muhallab repudiated the Umayyads and asserted that a member of the Banu Hashim would be appointed as Amir al-Mu’minin. This tradition was adopted by the Hashimiyah and, through this group, by the `Abbasids. Second, Yazid ibn al-Muhallab called himself “Qahtani,” which could be understood as the one who raised the black flag (the `Abbasids’ color), the symbol of opposition to the Umayyads, whose banner was white.

The inter-tribal fighting characterizing the Umayyad period increased during the last 25 to 30 years of their rule, because the major two of the last four caliphs, Hisham (724-43) and Marwan II (744-50), openly relied on the Mudar, despite the fact that `Umar II (717-20) had kept a balance between the tribes. When the caliphs favored the Mudar, the Yemenites considered this situation detrimental to their own interests. The support of a particular tribal confederation was, in most cases, crucial to the caliph’s ability to stay in power.

The disputes between the Northern and Southern tribal confederations were also exploited by the `Abbasids, who were fully aware of the Yemenites’ power in Khurasan and their enmity toward the Mudar and the Umayyads. Khurasan was essential to the `Abbasids’ propaganda and their army’s organization. They had popular support in this area, as reported in a tradition. Although written after the `Abbasids took power, this tradition says that the `Abbasids chose Khurasan for their propaganda because its people already accepted and supported them. However, the same tradition says that the people of Kufah leaned toward the children of `Ali ibn Abi Talib, the people of Basrah were loyal to the memory of `Uthman, the Syrians supported the Umayyads, and the people of Jazirah (Iraq) were Khawarij.

By supporting the Qahtan against their traditional enemies the Qays, the `Abbasids also gained their support in the war against the ruling dynasty. The `Abbasid army, through Abu Muslim al-Khurasani, recruited a large number of Yemenites, who were also good and experienced fighters. Major Arabic sources contain traditions dealing with the `Abbasids’ secret propaganda in which inter-tribal rivalry can be seen as a main issue in the `Abbasid revolution. Other Arabic sources reveal that one of the first missions of the `Abbasid emissaries and propagandists was to approach and
gain Yemenite (not Mudar) support in Khorasan. However, other sources offer contradictory traditions. Thus, one has to weigh the sources’ contradictions as well as the reliability of various traditions and of the sources themselves. For example, the *Akhbar al-Dawlah al-`Abbasiyah* contains a tradition in which Abu `Ikrimah was told, concerning the Arab tribes:

> When you comest to Marw, dwell in the midst of the tribes of Yaman, draw near unto Rabi`ah and beware of Mudar; but draw unto thyself whomsoever thou canst of the faithful ones among them.87

These instructions were clearly directed to obtain Yemenite support; however, the possibility of gaining the help of other Arab or mawali groups was kept open. Concerning the mawali (Persians), the *Akhbar al-Dawlah al-`Abbasiyah* also preserves a tradition that after Bukayr ibn Mahan was kept in Kufah and Abu `Ikrimah was sent to Khorasan, one of Abu `Ikrimah’s goals was to “attract as many Persians as possible, because they are the upholders of our da`wah and through them, God will support it.”88 A late source, one that is very important for the information and different traditions cited, is al-Maqrizi’s *Kitab al-Niza*`, which preserves a similar sort of instructions, but from the `Abbasid imam Ibrahim to Abu Muslim. Abu Muslim was supposed to look for the Yemenites’ support and live among them, probably to gain their trust, and, at the same time, beware of the Mudar, then considered the enemy.89

On the other hand, al-Tabari’s *Ta’rikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk* contains various traditions in which the mission was to approach the Yemenites, but, contrary to the other traditions, be gentle to the Mudar (‘*id al-nas ilayna wa anzil fi al-Yaman wa altif bi Mudar*).90 Several members of the Mudar confederation were also enrolled in the `Abbasid army.91 How can this apparent contradiction be solved? One explanation is that the Arab soldiers in the `Abbasid army, which included some Qays elements, belong to the last period of the `Abbasid revolution, when it broke out openly. The traditions about approaching the Yemenites and rejecting the Mudar belong to the revolution’s first period, when the propaganda was still secret.

The problem could also be solved by one of two other explanations. The first is that the *nuqaba’* were to attract the Qahtan to the `Abbasid cause while being gentle to the Qays. They were to gain Yemenite support first, but be open to obtaining the Mudar’s help as well, since all help was important and necessary. The second is that in the early stages of the `Abbasid propaganda, the *nuqaba’* were to gain the Yemenites’ support to the `Abbasid cause. Once obtained, the secret missionaries very carefully contacted the
Mudar and obtained some help from them, which is evident by their enrollment in the `Abbasid army. This second idea is more reasonable, since, according to some traditions, in the early stages of the `Abbasid da`wah, religion (dīn) was the strongest call to support the movement, even stronger, in certain ways, than tribal solidarity (`asabiyah).92

The Southern tribes, so unfavorably treated during the last two decades of Umayyad rule, also joined the `Abbasid revolution in the hope that the new government would improve their political and social status. The `Abbasids were very skillful in maneuvering the inter-tribal disputes for their own interests and objectives.93 In their call, they appeared to join the Shu`ubiyah movement by appealing to the equality (musawah) of all Muslims. The Yemenites responded positively, since they wanted justice to prevail. The `Abbasids also managed to transform the Yemenites’ grievances into an active political and military force of opposition to the Umayyads. Sufyan ibn Mu`awiyah of the al-Muhallab family made an unsuccessful attempt to capture Basrah for the `Abbasids in 749, which is evidence of the Qahtan’s support for the `Abbasid cause.94 Undoubtedly, deep at the bottom of the `Abbasid strategy, the constant factor of Arab inter-tribal rivalries was always present and played a significant role in the revolution’s popular dimensions.95

It is important to bear in mind that the Umayyads tried all possible ways to control power and gain legitimacy. They convinced many Muslims that the Umayyads were the Prophet’s only relatives, even before the `Abbasids started their propaganda. Several traditions, especially preserved by the later source al-Maqrizi’s Kitab al-Niza`, report the Umayyads claimed superiority to the Banu Hashim and to the Prophet himself, a claim much criticized by several Muslims and one that tainted the Umayyads’ commitment to Islam. In this respect, the tradition quoted by al-Maqrizi says:

[This deception on the part of the Umayyads and their partisans reached the point] that one day, al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf ascended the wooden stairway of the pulpit and proclaimed over the heads of those present: “Is your messenger more precious to you or your caliph?” He meant that `Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan ibn al-Hakam was superior to the messenger of God. When Jabala ibn [Zahr] heard him, he exclaimed: “By God, I swear that I will never pray behind him again! Moreover, if ever I see anybody taking up arms against al-Hajjaj, I will certainly take up arms myself and join him.”96

For the `Abbasids, their claims of legitimacy had two levels: First, they were descendants of the Prophet’s family (Ṣīda min al Muḥammad [the cho-
sen from Muhammad’s family]), and second, the political activism and practices of the Shi`ite Zayd ibn `Ali, the great grandson of `Ali and Fatimah, had led a revolt in 740 against the Umayyads. He claimed the right to lead not only because of inheritance (nass), but because he was the boldest and most active of all the family’s members. The `Abbasids capitalized on both grounds (the ideology and the political practice) and gained popular support for their struggle against the Umayyads, as well as legitimacy after they assumed power and established the second dynasty of Islam.

Conclusion
Pre-Islamic Arab society was characterized by profound tribal divisions and rivalries. The two tribal confederations represented two different ways of production, two opposed perceptions of the world. While the Qahtan (Southerners) settled down and devoted themselves mainly to agriculture, the Mudar (Northerners) were primarily nomads. Both confederations disputed water, land, and trade routes. Despite their conversion to Islam, their feuds continued and were transported wherever they went, be it to Iraq, Khurasan, North Africa, or al-Andalus.

These tribes played a significant role in Islam’s expansion. The Mudar directed the expansion toward the north and the east and blocked their enemies from acquiring booty, land, and administrative positions. The Qahtan then directed the Muslim armies toward the west. In Iraq and Khurasan, both confederations disputed land, power, and prestige. Their feuds in Kufah and Basrah, as well as the later foundation of the garrison city of al-Wasit to control the tribes, are relevant issues of Umayyad history. To keep power and either consolidate the empire or gain more territory, the Umayyads exploited tribal disputes.

Despite the exceptions analyzed above, the Umayyads mainly favored, in the long run, the Mudar confederation. The `Abbasids, in their secret propaganda, which had a clear ideology and claims of legitimacy for power, attracted the Qahtan tribes, against whom the Umayyads discriminated. The `Abbasids were skillful enough to be gentle and attract the Mudar tribes to their side. The Umayyad practice of exploiting tribal disputes, skillfully used by the `Abbasids, eventually drove the Umayyads from power and brought a new dynasty to rule the empire. The role of the tribes was essential in this change of dynastic power. The `Abbasids also obtained the help of the Shi`ites through the Hashimiyah as well as the support of the mawali, both of which enabled the `Abbasids to realize their objectives.
Notes


Marín-Guzmán: Arab Tribes, the Umayyad Dynasty, and the `Abbasid Revolution

al-Mamalik, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden: 1927), 14. For the Ghassan and Asad tribes and the Yemenite settlements in al-Jazirah al-Arabiyyah, see al-Istakhri, Kitab Masalik al-Mamalik, 14. See also Ibn Qutaybah, Al-Ma`arif, 626-37 for a detailed study of the Yemenites and their kings. Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil fi al-Ta`rikh, 4:159. (Cairo ed.); al-Dinawari, Al-Akhbar al-Tiwal, 277-80. See also Patricia Crone, Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Polity (Cambridge: 1980), 43; Kitab al-`Uyun wa al-Hada`iq fi Akhbar al-Haqa`iq, ed. M. J. de Goeje and P. de Jong (Leiden: 1869), 3:2-3. See also al-Ya`qubi, Ta`rikh al-Ya`qubi, 2:285. For a general view, see also Hugh Kennedy, The Early `Abbasid Caliphate (London and Sydney: 1986), 35-37; Marín-Guzmán, Popular Dimensions of the `Abbasid Revolution, passim. It is important to bear in mind that most Arab tribes were allied with other tribes, thus accepting the confederations. Very few tribes wished to be on their own. To confederate was relevant for many, especially for weaker tribes seeking protection from stronger ones. These pre-Islamic alliances had a relevant place in society. Despite their impact, Islam denied such alliances and preached a religious relationship of the individual with the ummah and with Allah. Islam also preached fraternity among all people. Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said: la hilfah fi al-Islam wa lakinn tamassaku bi hilf al-jahiliyyah [There is no alliance in Islam, but respect the alliances of the Jahiliyah]. For more information, see al-Isfahani, Kitab al-Aghani (Bulaq: 1285 a.h.), 12:157.


8. Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, 1:50-55. Goldziher wrote: “Satires were an indispensable part of war. The tribal poet boasted that he was no mere composer of verses but an instigator of war, who sent forth mocking verses against those who scorned his tribe” (p. 50) and: “Thus, in a contest between tribes, the arrows flew from the mouths of poets as much as from the quivers of warriors, and the wounds that they inflicted were deeply embedded in the tribe’s honour and were felt for generations. It is therefore not astonishing to learn that poets were greatly feared amongst the Arabs” (p. 51).


that Christianity was found among some members of Rabi`ah, Ghassan, and Quda`ah; and Judaism among some Himyar, Banu Kinanah, Banu al-Harith ibn Ka`b, and Kindah. The rest were polytheists. Marín-Guzmán, Popular Dimensions of the `Abbasid Revolution, 12. See also Marín-Guzmán, *Kitab al-Bukhala* [El Libro de los Avaros] de al-Jahiz, 44-61.


16. Al-Maqqari, Kitab Nāfḥ al-Tīb, ed. Reinhart Dozy and Gustave Dugat (Leiden: 1855-61; reimpresión, Amsterdam: 1967); Muhammedan Dynasties in Spain, trans. Pascual de Gayangos (New York: 1964), 2:24. As this translation is poor and imprecise, reading the original Arabic is absolutely necessary. In this essay, most of the references to Kitab Nāfḥ al-Tīb are from the original Arabic, although for some general information and when the translation is reliable, the reader is suggested to consult the English version. See also Hasan, Al-Qaba’il al-ʿArabiyah, 39-60; Marín-Guzmán, Popular Dimensions of the ʿAbbasid Revolution, 14.


18. See the major Arabic sources quoted in this essay: al-Tabari, Taʾrikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk; al-Baladhuri, Ansab al-Ashraf and Futuh al-Buldan; Ibn Majah, Taʾrikh al-Khulafaʾ; al-Suyuti, Taʾrikh al-Khulafaʾ; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil fī al-Taʾrikh (Cairo: 1290 a.h.; see also the Leiden-Beirut Ed., 1965). See also al-Istakhri, Kitab Masalik al-Mamalik, 7-9 for a good description of Dar al-Islam’s extensions and frontiers. For the settlements of the Arab tribes, see 12-14, 36-55, and 78-88. Patricia Crone, in her Slaves on Horses (p. 43) asserts that al-Hajjaj did not favor the Qays confederation over the Yemenites. To support this idea, she provides a list of the subgovernors under al-Hajjaj (Appendix 3, numbers 1 to 47) in which a fair division of power and positions between the two confederations is clearly demonstrated. However, we need to remember that al-Hajjaj, a leader and a very skillful politician, tried to keep a balance between the tribes. But in the long run, his policies, as well as the Umayyad administration, favored the Qays in positions of power and in land ownership, as proven by the Arabic sources. Al-Hajjaj started a school of rulers under his influence who followed his policies. Notably, these rulers were mainly from the Qays. For further information concerning the role of the Arabs as well as the importance of the mawali in the origins of the ʿAbbasid revolution, see Kennedy, The Early ʿAbbasid Caliphate, 37-39, 42-45.

19. For more details on the importance of the various languages in the Muslim empire, with special emphasis on Persian and Turkish in the eastern provinces, see Richard Frye, The Golden Age of Persia (New York: 1975), 202-7, 212. See Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom, 492 ff., where he explains the predominance of Persian in Khurasan and in Ma waraʾ al-Nahr, where Arabs had to learn and practice it for such daily activities as the inter-relations in the market (suq). This proves that Arabization took many years to be completed. See also Crone, Slaves on Horses, 61. For the western provinces, especially for al-Andalus, see Ramón Menéndez Pidal, El español en sus primeros tiempos (Buenos Aires: 1942), 33-56 and 118-19; Ramón Menéndez Pidal, Orígenes del español: Estado lingüístico de la Península Ibérica hasta el siglo XI (Madrid, 1950), 415-40; Montgomery Watt, Historia de la España Islámica (Madrid: 1980), 173-74; Évariste Lévi-Provençal, España Musulmana:
For lack of a better term, I have chosen to use “Spaniards,” although there was no consciousness of being “Spaniards” in the early Middle Ages, nor a clear idea of nationality. “Spaniards” implies the Christian inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula’s northern kingdoms, the descendants of the Hispano-Romans and the Visigoths.


Al-Baladhuri, *Futuh al-Buldan* (Beirut: 1957), 636 (Beirut ed.).


26. Ibid., 212-20. (298-314 of the Beirut ed.).


33. Quoted by Manuel Ruiz Figueroa, “Imamah o autoridad en los primeros tiempos del Islam,” *Estudios Orientales* 9, nos. 1-2 (24-25), (1974): 61-82. `Abd Rabbihi, in his *AL-`IQD AL-FARID*, 4:258, quoted what Abu Bakr said to the participants in the Saqifah affair: “We the Muhajirun were the first to accept Islam; we possess the most noble pedigree; our abode is the most central; we have the best leaders, we are nearest in kin to the Prophet of Allah.” (Quoted by Sharon, *Black Banners*, 37.)


36. Ibn Qutaybah, *TARIKH AL-QUR’AN*, 691. See also 642 for the Qahtan’s submission to Islam. In various chapters, he quoted several leaders who came to the Prophet to submit to Islam. See Hasan, *Al-Qaba’il al-`Arabiyah*, 13-14.
40. For more details on these issues, see Marín-Guzmán, *Popular Dimensions of the `Abbasid Revolution*, 21 ff.
43. See Ibn Khallikan, *Wafayat al-A`yan*, 4:86-87; *Akhbar Majmu`ah*, 6-7 (20-21 of the Sp. trans.); Crone, *Slaves on Horses*, 53. For more information on the discrimination against the *mawali*, who were not paid for their services in the


45. For more details on the origin of the Umayyad dynasty and Mu‘awiya, see Ibn Majah, *Ta‘rikh al-Khulafa‘*, 27; al-Suyuti, *Ta‘rikh al-Khulafa‘*, 194-205. See also Ibn Qutaybah, *Al-Ma‘arif*, 344-45 and 349-50; al-Ya‘qubi, *Ta‘rikh al-Ya‘qubi*, 2:216-24. See also ‘Amad, *Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi*, 43-48; Kennedy, *Prophet*, 83 ff. The people of Syria gave Mu‘awiya the bay‘ah. For more information, see Ibn Qutaybah, *Al-Imamah wa al-Siyasah*, 1:74. For a detailed description of Mu‘awiya’s life and activities, see al-Baladhuri, *Ansab al-Ashraf*, ed. Max Schloessinger (Jerusalem: 1971), 4A:11-138. For the bay‘ah to Yazid and the actual practice of a dynastic system, see al-Baladhuri, *Ansab al-Ashraf*, ed. Max Schloessinger (Jerusalem: 1938), 4B:12-13; Ibn Qutaybah, *Al-Imamah wa al-Siyasah*, 1:174-75. The Arabic sources are not objective when dealing with the Umayyad dynasty, especially those written during the ‘Abbasid period. Some early Arabic sources do not consider the Umayyads as legitimate rulers, but as usurpers. A clear example of such sources is the work of the Shi‘ite al-Mas‘udi, who, in his *Al-Tanbih wa al-Ishraf*, explained the government of the Rashidun caliphs as khilafah (i.e., caliphate), as well as those of the ‘Abbasids up to al-Mustakfi and al-Muti‘ al-Fadl, his contemporaries. In al-Mas‘udi’s opinion, all Umayyad rulers were not caliphs but kings, the only exception being ‘Umar Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. Al-Mas‘udi did not define their tenures as as khilafah, but as ayyam (the days or the period) of each Umayyad rulers, with the exception already mentioned. For example, Mu‘awiya’s biography is introduced with the title “Ayyam Mu‘awiya ibn Abi Sufyan” [The period of Mu‘awiya Ibn Abi Sufyan]. Al-Mas‘udi also considered al-Hasan ibn ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib a caliph, and his biography is introduced with the title “Khilafat al-Hasan ibn ‘Ali ‘alayhi al-Salam” [The Caliphate of al-Hasan b. ‘Ali, peace be upon him]. For more details, see al-Mas‘udi, *Al-Tanbih wa al-Ishraf*, 276-78.


49. Michael Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest* (Princeton: 1984), 248-49; Hasan, *Al-Qaba’il al-‘Arabiyyah*, 21-38. The Azd tribe was one of the most important Arab tribes, with more than 27 subdivisions that are now called “Qahtan.” For more details, see Hasan, *Al-Qaba’il al-‘Arabiyyah*, 22. For more information on these subdivisions, see also Yaqut, *Mu`jam al-Buldan*, 3:330 ff; on their mobilization from the areas they previously inhabited, especially near Makkah and the northern Hijaz, to al-Sham, see Ibn Khaldun, *Kitab al-`Ibar wa Diwan al-Mubtada’ wa al-Khabar* (Beirut: 1956), 2:524-28; on Khurasan as a frontier of the Muslim empire, see al-Hamdani, *Kitab Sifah Jazirat al-`Arab*, 32; and for a clear description of Khurasan as a frontier region near the Turkish land (Ard al-Turk), see 38 and 43.


53. Al-Baladhuri, *Futuh al-Buldan*, 414. For more details on the Northern tribes’ support of Ibn al-Zubayr’s revolt, see al-Baladhuri, *Ansab al-Ashraf*, 4:136-40. See also ‘Amad, *Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi*, 113, where he makes the interesting observation that the Northern tribes joined and supported Ibn al-Zubayr because they feared the power that the Yemenites were gaining through the Umayyads’ support.


57. For more details concerning al-Hajjaj’s role in taxation in Iraq and the development of *iqta’, see Abu Yusuf, *Kitab al-Kharj*, 63; ‘Amad, *Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi*, passim, esp. 23-24 and 85-87. Ihsan Sidqi al-‘Amad discusses (85-87 and 101) the origins and development of the relations between the Thaqafi tribe (mainly located in Ta’if) and the Umayyads. These relations were improved mainly under Marwan ibn al-Hakam, when al-Hajjaj and his father participated in the administration of Fustat (Egypt). The Arabic sources contain contradictory accounts of when al-Hajjaj and his father left Egypt for Syria, either in the time of Marwan ibn al-Hakam or ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan. However, the sources agree that al-Hajjaj and his father joined in Syria the military expedition organized by Marwan ibn al-Hakam to stop the fitnah led by Ibn al-Zubayr in the Hijaz. Whether or not that meant that they moved to al-Sham is still a point under discussion. Later on, a Thaqafi (al-Hajjaj Ibn Yusuf) working for the Umayyads defeated Ibn al-Zubayr. Al-Hajjaj was also the architect of ‘Abd al-Malik’s reforms. For more information concerning al-Hajjaj’s activities in Ta’if, see Ibn Qutaybah, *Al-Ma’arif*, 548. See also the following sources: ‘Amad, *Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi*, 385-386; Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam, *Futuh Msr wa Akhbaruhu*, 109 ff; Ruwayha, *Jabbar Thaqif: Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf*, passim, esp. 112 and 128-42; Taha, *Al-’Iraq fi ’Ahd al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi*, 26-27. See also Ibn Qutaybah, *Al-Ma’arif*, 396-97. For more details on al-Hajjaj’s *bay’ah* to ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan, see Al-‘Uyun wa al-Hada’iq fi Akhbar al-Haqa’iq, 3:9 and see 3:10-11 for al-Hajjaj’s administrative positions; Kennedy, *Prophet*, 100; Crone, *Slaves on Horses*, 42 ff. For ‘Umar Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz following the *iqta’ institution, see Yahya ibn Adam al-Qurashi, *Kitab al-Kharaj* (Lahore: 1395 a.h.), 83-89; Rayyis, *’Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan*, 187-93; Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest*, 37-38 and 95. For more details on al-Hajjaj’s role


70. For more information on Sulayman, see Ibn Majah, Taʾrīkh al-Khulafaʾ, 31-32; al-Dinawari, Akhbar al-Tiwal, 329-30; al-Suyuti, Taʾrīkh al-Khulafaʾ, 225-28; al-Masʿudi, Al-Tanbih wa al-Ishraf, 291; al-Masʿudi, Muruj al-Dhahab, 5:396-415. For more details on Sulayman’s reign, see Al-ʿUyun wa al-Hadaʾiq fi Akhbar al-Haqaʾiq, 3:16-37; al-Yaʿqubi, Taʾrīkh al-ʿaʾqubi,
2:293-300. For more information on Qutaybah ibn Muslim’s revolt, see al-Tabari, Ta’rikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk, 2:1238 (Leiden ed.); al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-Buldan, 422-24.


72. Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil fi al-Ta’rikh, 4:159 (Cairo ed.). For a good study of the relations between al-Muhallab and al-Hajjaj, see al-Dinawari, Al-Akabar al-Tiwal, 277-80. See also Crone, Slaves on Horses, 43. For more information on the replacement of Yazid Ibn al-Muhallab by Qutaybah ibn Muslim al-Bahali see Al-`Uyun wa al-Hada’iq fi Akhbar al-Haqa’iq, 3:2-3. See also al-Ya’qubi, Ta’rikh al-Ya’qubi, 2:285, where he explained that al-Hajjaj removed Yazid ibn al-Muhallab from the governorship of Khurasan and appointed al-Mufaddil and, later on, Qutaybah ibn Muslim al-Bahali.

73. Hasan, Al-Qaba’il al-`Arabiyah, 163-82. For more information on the Arab settlements after the conquests (futuh), see 163-79. For a study of the tribes after Yazid’s death, see 179-80. For the Qays settlements in Khurasan, see 181-82. For the Tamim, see 183-89. For the Azd settlements and alliances with other tribes, see 189-91. For more details on some of the struggles between Ibn al-Ash’ath and al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, see al-Mas’udi, Al-Tanbih wa al-Ishraf, 288-89. For the events taking place in Kufah and Basrah, see 288. Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil fi al-Ta’rikh, 4:467-69 and 4:501-2. For more details, see 4:413-16 and 4:461-62 (Leiden-Beirut ed.). Ibn Qutaybah, Al-Ma‘arif, 357; al-Tabari, Ta’rikh al-Ya’qubi, 2:277-79; al-Dinawari, Al-Akabar al-Tiwal, 316-24; Ruwayhah, Jabbar Thaqif: Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, 172-76. For more information on the historic fact that Yazid ibn al-Muhallab sent back to al-Hajjaj only the Qays followers of Ibn al-Ash’ath, see 174. See also al-Tabari, Ta’rikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk, 2:1318 ff. (Leiden ed.); Kennedy, Prophet, 102; Marin-Guzmán, Popular Dimensions of the ‘Abbasid Revolution, 30.

74. See Hellmut von Ritter, “Studien zur Geschichte der Islamischen Frömmigkeit al-Hasan al-Basri,” Der Islam, no. 21 (1933), 1-83, esp. 50-52. For more information on Ibn al-Ash’ath’s opposition to al-Hajjaj, see Ruwayhah, Jabbar Thaqif: Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, 169-70; Taha, Al-`Iraq fi `Ahd al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi, 84-90. This author analyzes the role of religion in this revolt, which was supported by a great number of qurra’ and fuqaha’ (84-87). On the other hand, Taha also emphasizes the idea that al-Hajjaj appealed to Islam as well. Al-Hajjaj considered those supporting Ibn al-Ash’ath infidels (kafirun) and enemies of Islam (85-86). For more details on the support of the qurra’ and the fuqaha’ for Ibn al-Ash’ath, see al-Baladhuri, Ansab al-Ashraf, 11:326, where he explained that the religious people gave the bay’ah to Ibn al-Ash’ath over the Book of God and the Sunnah of His Prophet. See also al-Tabari, Ta’rikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk, 2:1058 (Leiden ed.); Kennedy, Prophet, 101-2.


79. See Ibn Qutaybah, *`Uyun al-Akhbar*, ed. Carl Brockelmann (Berlin: 1900-8), vol. 2, passim; Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest*, 482-83; Ruwayha, *Jabbar Thaqif: Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf*, 168. See Taha, *Al-Iraq fi `Ahd al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi*, 87 and 94, where he mentioned, from the manuscript of Ahmad ibn `Uthman Ibn A`tham’s *Futuh* (2:106 b), that `Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan’s instruction to his brother Muhammad ibn Marwan and his son `Abd Allah, whom he sent to stop this revolt, that they were to force the Iraqis to submit by expelling the Syrians from the Iraqis’ houses. These instructions were influential in stopping the rebellion, in hopes of ending the Syrian presence in those regions. Moreover, al-Hajjaj’s offer of a general pardon was also vital. However, the presence of Syrian troops was very important. For more details, see al-Tabari, *Ta’rikh al-Rasul wa al-Muluk*, 2:1060 ff. (Leiden ed.).


82. Ibn Khallikan, *Wafayat al-A’yan*, 6:278-309. Ibn Khallikan wrote: ‘*Rama al-khilafah li nafsihi*’ [He appropriated the caliphate for himself]. See also al-Baladhuri, *Ansab al-Ashraf*, 710 b from the Constantinople manuscript, quoted by Francesco Gabrieli, “La rivolta,” 216. Gabrieli showed, after a detailed study of the sources and all the traditions, that Yazid ibn al-Muhallab claimed the caliphate, repudiated caliph Yazid II, declared himself caliph, and rejected the entire Umayyad dynasty (“La rivolta,” 213-15). Shaban has a different opinion concerning these issues. After dealing with only a few traditions, he concluded in his *The ’Abbasid Revolution*, 94: “There is no evidence at all that Yazid tried to supplant Umayyad rule by any other, and it is reported explicitly that he did not withdraw his alliance to Yazid II.” His opinions should be read critically, since there is evidence in other Arabic sources and in several traditions, as demonstrated by Gabrieli, that Yazid ibn al-Muhallab declared himself caliph.


86. Al-Baladhuri, *Ansab al-Ashraf*, 3:81. See also Akbar al-Dawlah al-’Abbasiyah, 205-7; Al-Muqaddasi, *Ahsan al-Taqasim fi Ma’rifat al-Aqalim*, 293-94. According to al-Tabari, when Abu al-‘Abbas was proclaimed caliph in the great mosque of Kufah, after the ’Abbasids captured it from the Umayyads, he used his inaugural speech to appeal to and praise the people of Kufah. See also al-Tabari, *Ta’rikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk*, 3:30 (Leiden ed.). I quote John Alden Williams’ translation of this part (The ’Abbasid Revolution [New York: 1985], 154): “People of Kufa, you are the halting-place of our love, the lodging of our affections. You it is who remained steadfast, you who were not deflected from our love by the injustice of the people of tyranny against you until you reached our epoch and God brought you our revolution.” For further information, see also ’Arafah, *Al-
Khurasanīyun wa Dawruhum, 81; Marín-Guzmán, Popular Dimensions of the `Abbasid Revolution, 93-94.

87. Akhbar al-Dawlah al-`Abbasiyah, 202-4, quoted by Sharon, Black Banners, 158. For more details concerning Abu Ikrimah preaching the `Abbasid da’wah in Khurasan, see al-Dinawari, Al-Akhbar al-Tiwal, 333; al-Ya’qubi, Ta’rikh al-Ya’qubi, 2:312. 'Arafah, Al-Khurasanīyun wa Dawruhum, 49. See also Marín-Guzmán, Popular Dimensions of the `Abbasid Revolution, 93-94.

88. Akhbar al-Dawlah al-`Abbasiyah, 204. See also Marín-Guzmán, Popular Dimensions of the `Abbasid Revolution, 95-96.

89. Al-Maqrizi, Kitab al-Niza’, 88. Imam Ibrahim’s instructions to Abu Muslim, as preserved by al-Maqrizi, were: “You are one of us, the House of the Prophet; observe faithfully my instructions to you. Look to this group of the Yamanis; treat them with honour and dwell amongst them, for God will only bring this affair to a successful conclusion by means of their support. But be wary of how you handle Rabi’a, and as for Mudar, they are the enemy who lurks close to your door. So kill anyone whose loyalty you are doubtful about; if you are able to clear Khurasan of every single Arabic speaker, then do it, and if there is any youth who has reached five spans in height and you are suspicious about him, then kill him.” Al-Tabari, Ta’rikh al-Rusul wa al-Mulak, 3:25-26 (Leiden ed.) also relates Imam Ibrahim’s letter to Abu Muslim, in which the imam ordered him to kill all the Arabic speakers in Khurasan. What does this tradition really mean? Was it created after the `Abbasids took power as an anti-Arab feeling? At this point, it is difficult to determine it using the Arabic sources. On the other hand, al-Tabari also preserved different traditions about these events, sometimes even in clear contradiction. For a detailed study of the various traditions, see Jacob Lassner, Islamic Revolution and Historical Memory: An Inquiry into the Art of `Abbasid Apologetics (New Haven: 1986), passim, esp. 62-71. See also ‘Arafah, Al-Khurasanīyun wa Dawruhum, 79, where she analyzed Marwan II’s fear that the `Abbasids could spread their revolt to other parts of the empire. For this reason, the caliph decided to keep Ibrahim in prison. For more details concerning these events, see al-Dinawari, Al-Akhbar al-Tiwal, 359; al-Ya’qubi, Ta’rikh al-Ya’qubi, 2:342-43; Al-`Uyun wa al-Hada’iq fi Akhbar al-Haqa’iq, 3:183 ff. See also Cahen, Les peuples musulmans, 149-50; Crone, Slaves on Horses, 65. Crone asserted that this important leader of the `Abbasid revolution died in Marwan II’s prison. See also al-Tabari, Ta’rikh al-Rusul wa al-Mulak, 3:42 (Leiden ed.), where al-Tabari explained that despite the existence of various traditions, Ibrahim died in Marwan’s prison. See also Marín-Guzmán, Popular Dimensions of the `Abbasid Revolution, 93.

90. Al-Tabari, Ta’rikh al-Rusul wa al-Mulak, ed. Muhammad Abu al-Fadl Ibrahim (Cairo: 1976), 7:49, quoted by ‘Arafah, Al-Khurasanīyun wa Dawruhum, 50. See also Cahen, Les peuples musulmans, 137, where he analyzed the tribal
rivalries between Northern and Southern confederations. Cahen also pointed out that the 'Abbasids capitalized on these rivalries. The anonymous author of *Al-`Uyun wa al-Hada'iq fi Akhbar al-Haqa'iq*, 3:183-84 also preserved the various traditions about these inter-tribal rivalries and the 'Abbasid approach to the tribes. See also Marín-Guzmán, *Popular Dimensions of the 'Abbasid Revolution*, 94.


95. The secret propaganda led by the 'Abbasids for around 30 years (718-47) allowed them to gain the support of the Southern tribes and of numerous members of the Mudar confederation, as well as the mawali and the Shi‘ites. The Shi‘ites acceptance came through the Hashimiyah and Abu Hashim’s apparent designation of Muhammad ibn ‘Ali, leader of the ‘Abbasid group, as his successor. For further details, see Sabatino Moscati, “Il Testamento di Abu Hashim,” *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, no. 27: Fascicoli 1-4, (1952): 28-46; Marín-Guzmán, *Popular Dimensions of the 'Abbasid Revolution*, passim, esp. 81-96.
